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Reproductive Dreams and Nightmares:
Sperm Donation in the Age of At-Home
Genetic Testing
Nofar Yakovi Gan-Or*
Recent technological developments surrounding genetic testing pose new
challenges to well-established reproductive practices. One current example
is the fertility industry’s struggle to maintain gamete donor anonymity
against the growing use of direct-to-consumer DNA tests. Consider the
widely covered story of Danielle Teuscher, who in 2019 accidentally
discovered the identity of her daughter’s anonymous sperm donor after using
a 23andMe DNA test. Danielle’s attempt to reach out to the newfound family
member was followed by a cease and desist letter from the sperm bank for
violating their agreement. In addition, the sperm bank refused to give
Danielle the four vials of sperm from the same donor, which she had reserved
for future use, thus thwarting her reproductive plans to have genetic siblings
for her daughter.
The Teuscher case introduces a type of reproductive dispute that United
States courts have not yet resolved. This Article considers several of the new
legal questions produced by this set of novel circumstances, about the legal
framework through which the dispute should be adjudicated, the nature of
the rights at stake, and the harms imposed by forced or confounded
procreation. It argues that in the social context of anonymous sperm
donation, the contractual approach is a more appropriate—if insufficient—
legal prism through which a dispute over the use of donated sperm should
be resolved. The context of sperm donation also demands a nuanced
treatment of the rights at stake—one that distinguishes, for example, between
the right not to be a genetic parent and the right not to be a parent in the
legal sense. Furthermore, properly articulating the interests of the parties
requires a reassessment of the harm that forced procreation will impose on
a person who at least at some point in time agreed to father a child they
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would not know or care for, as well as the harm imposed on a person denied
a child carrying a particular genetic constituency.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 792
I. THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE............................................ 796
A. Regulating Donation .................................................... 796
B. Rights of Gamete Donors ............................................. 798
C. Rights of Donor-Conceived Children .......................... 798
II. DOE V. MINISTRY OF HEALTH .................................................... 799
A. Background: The Israeli Legal Framework ................ 799
B. The Case ...................................................................... 802
III. POSSIBLE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS ............................................. 804
A. The Contractual Approach .......................................... 804
B. The Balancing Test Approach...................................... 806
IV. THE RIGHTS AT STAKE ........................................................... 807
A. The Right Not to Procreate .......................................... 807
B. The Right to Procreate ................................................. 810
V. REPRODUCTIVE HARMS ........................................................... 813
A. Harm to the Donor....................................................... 814
B. Harm to the Recipient .................................................. 817
VI. CHOOSING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK.......................................... 821
A. In Favor of Contractual Enforcement.......................... 822
B. Against Contractual Enforcement................................ 824
C. Application: Anonymous Sperm Donation Agreements
.................................................................................... 828
D. Drafting Recommendations ......................................... 830
CONCLUSION................................................................................. 831
INTRODUCTION
Danielle Teuscher, a thirty-year-old nanny from Portland, Oregon,
took a 23andMe DNA test that she bought as a Christmas gift for her
family and friends. 1 Her five-year-old daughter, Zoe, had been conceived
through the use of an anonymous sperm donation from Northwest
Cryobank in Spokane, Washington. 2 Danielle decided to get another
23andMe test for Zoe in order to learn about her ancestry and medical
background. 3 This commonly used consumer DNA test, however,
1. Jacqueline Mroz, A Mother Learns the Identity of Her Child’s Grandmother. A Sperm Bank
Threatens to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2019), www.nytimes.com/2019/02/16/health/spermdonation-dna-testing.html [https://perma.cc/KMD6-ST8D].
2. Id.
3. Id.
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revealed more than Danielle ever hoped it would: The test results
identified the mother of the donor—that is, Zoe’s grandmother. “Excited
and curious” about these findings, Danielle reached out to the newly
found family member, saying that she would be open for contact with
either her or her son. 4 The grandmother responded: “I don’t understand.”5
This laconic response was followed by a cease-and-desist letter from the
sperm bank, threatening Danielle with penalties of $20,000 for violating
the agreement she had signed with the bank by trying to contact the donor
or seek his identity. 6 The letter further stated that if she continued this
“course of action,” the bank would seek a restraining order or injunction.7
Danielle was devastated.
This widely covered story brought to the fore an ongoing legal and
ethical debate over gamete donation,8 and the challenges direct-toconsumer DNA tests pose to the fertility industry’s efforts to secure donor
anonymity. 9 In the US, despite calls to revise and regulate gamete
donation, this aspect of the reproductive market remains largely
unregulated, leaving unanswered many questions that technological
developments give rise to. 10 In Teuscher’s case, for example, legal
experts questioned whether Zoe could be constrained by a contract that
her mother had signed before she was even born, and whether a provision
limiting a child’s ability to find her genetic origins could be enforced. 11
But Danielle’s pursuit of her daughter’s genetic origins had another
grave consequence for her reproductive life: She was denied access to
four vials of sperm from the same donor, which she had reserved for
future use. 12 In response to her plea, the sperm bank agreed to refund the

4. Id.
5. Woman Uses DNA Test, Finds Sperm Donor—and Pays a “Devastating” Price, CBS NEWS
(Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/woman-finds-sperm-donor-after-using-dna-testraising-questions-about-donor-anonymity/ [https://perma.cc/N28L-N9BA]; see also Mroz, supra
note 1 (offering yet another account of Teuscher’s story).
6. Mroz, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., id.; CBS NEWS, supra note 5; Jacqueline Mroz, DNA Testing Opens a Window into
Sperm Banks, HERALD-TRIB. (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.heraldtribune.com/entertainmentlife/
20190226/dna-testing-opens-window-into-sperm-banks [https://perma.cc/5UV8-PUTU]; Natalie
Rahhal, Sperm Bank PUNISHES Mother for Accidentally Finding Her Donor Through 23AndMe,
DAILY MAIL (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-6653943/sperm-bankpunishes-mother-accidentally-finding-donor-23andme.html [https://perma.cc/KF7E-VKB5].
9. Susan Dominus, Sperm Donors Can’t Stay Secret Anymore. Here’s What That Means, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (June 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/magazine/sperm-donorquestions.html [https://perma.cc/DM29-V8C6].
10. See generally Maya Sabatello, Regulating Gamete Donation in the U.S.: Ethical, Legal and
Social Implications, 4 LAWS 352, 353–57 (2015).
11. Mroz, supra note 1.
12. CBS NEWS, supra note 5.
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amount she paid for the vials, but stood by its refusal to return the vials
to her—a decision Danielle decided to fight. 13
This case introduces a set of circumstances that US courts have yet to
encounter. While reproductive disputes have become prevalent over the
years along with the growing use of assisted reproductive technologies
(ARTs), none of the publicly available cases involve a conflict between
an anonymous gamete donor, a recipient, and a reproductive services
provider. 14 Teuscher’s case thus raises a set of new legal and ethical
questions lying at the intersection of family law, constitutional law, and
contracts, which are the focus of this article.
The first question regards the legal framework that should be applied
to such a case. At least two frameworks have been applied in reproductive
disputes involving ARTs: a contractual approach, where decisions are
based on the agreements that the donor and recipient entered into with the
sperm bank and/or with one another; and a balancing-of-interests test,
where the rights and interests of the parties are weighed against one
another. Developed in the context of pre-embryo disposition disputes,
arguments in favor of and against each framework assume a familial
relationship between the parties. This Article shows that, because of this
difference, the balancing-of-interests approach will be of limited value in
the social context of anonymous sperm donation and that the contractual
approach is a more appropriate—if insufficient—legal prism through
which disputes should be resolved.
A second interrelated question raised by this case regards the nature of
the rights at stake. The prevailing framework would place the recipient’s
right to be a parent against the donor’s right not to be a parent. Yet the
context of sperm donation demands a more nuanced treatment—one that
goes beyond a “monolithic” concept of the right not to be a parent. 15 For
example, it is important to make a distinction between the right not to be

13. Mroz, supra note 1. In June, Teuscher first filed suit against the sperm bank in a federal
court in the Eastern District of Washington for injunctive relief and damages in the amount of
$100,000. For the most recent version of her complaint, see Second Amended Complaint, Teuscher
v. CCB-NWB, LLC, 19-cv-00204 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 12, 2019), available at
https://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/sites/default/files/files/AmendedComplaint_11_13_19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YLB9-WYHZ]. Danielle recently started a GoFundMe campaign to help her
cover the cost of her legal battle against the bank. Danielle Teuscher, Help Danielle and Zoe Fight
NW Cryobank, GOFUNDME (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.gofundme.com/f/9f8nm5-tbd
[https://perma.cc/VY6K-YZYN].
14. Though it is unclear whether the donor in this case explicitly withdrew his consent to any
further use of his sperm vials, or otherwise contributed to the sperm bank’s reaching its decision to
deny Danielle access to the sperm, the analysis proposed in this Article assumes that the onceanonymous donor objects to its use.
15. See generally I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
1115 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen, Genetic Parent].
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a genetic parent and the right not to be a parent in the social or legal sense,
because these different rights may warrant different levels of protection.
The third question relates to the harms that ruling either in favor of or
against each party will entail. This part of the analysis tends to focus on
the life circumstances of both parties in evaluating the types of harms that
unwanted or deprived procreation may impose on them. There is some
consistency in the way these financial, physical, and psychological harms
have been conceptualized over the years. However, the case of an
anonymous sperm donor requires a reassessment of, for example, the
harm that forced procreation will impose on a person who at least at some
point in time agreed to father a child he would not know or care for; as
well as the harm imposed on a person denied a child carrying some
particular genetic constituency that the recipient has dreamed of and
hoped for.
In engaging such questions, this Article draws on cases involving preembryo disposition disputes between couples, the most common type of
reproductive disputes to have reached American courts thus far. It also
draws on a case that came before the Israeli Supreme Court in 2013, Doe
v. Ministry of Health, 16 in which the underlying facts were akin to those
Teuscher faced. In Doe, the Court had to decide between a sperm donor
who had a change of heart about his prior decision to grant use of his
sperm, and Doe, a woman who had already used the donor’s sperm to
conceive her first child and wished to use the same donor’s sperm for her
second child.
The analysis proposed in this Article highlights the unique
characteristics of cases involving an anonymous gamete donation
compared to other reproductive disputes courts have encountered thus far.
It also considers how the emergence of new reproductive practices, such
as at-home DNA tests, may challenge long-standing practices and the
ideologies underlying them about the family and familial relations. It may
thus inform courts’ future decisions by pointing to some of the pitfalls of
applying the legal tools they currently have at their disposal to resolve
these types of disputes.
The Article begins in Part I with the legal and normative background
of the practice of sperm donation in the United States, where it is largely
unregulated, yet prevalent and relatively uncontroversial. Part II
describes the Doe decision’s factual basis and provides an overview of
the Israeli Supreme Court’s analysis. It also describes the regulation of
16. See generally HCJ 4077/12 Doe v. Ministry of Health (Feb. 5, 2013), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) [hereinafter The Doe Case], available at
http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Doe%20v.%20Ministry%20of%20
Health.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3G5-GMCT].
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sperm donation in Israel, where it is controlled by a relatively
comprehensive apparatus, thus providing necessary context to the
decision in Doe. Part III outlines the two principal frameworks that US
courts have employed for the resolution of pre-embryo disputes over the
past two and a half decades. Part IV discusses the nature of the right to
procreate and the right not to procreate, first in general, then in the case
of disputes over anonymous sperm donation. Part V considers the harms
that a ruling in favor of or against the recipient and the donor may impose,
and compares these harms to those commonly evaluated by courts in
reproductive disputes. Part VI discusses the principal arguments against
the contractual approach, and considers to what extent these arguments
apply in the context of anonymous sperm donation. It then applies the
contractual framework to Teuscher’s case. This part ends with a brief
discussion of possible steps reproductive service providers may take to
ease the task of enforcing sperm donation agreements.
I. THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Different regulations address several different aspects of sperm
donation as a reproductive practice. First, they may address the act of
donation itself, including restrictions on the eligibility criteria for
becoming a sperm donor, what monetary compensation it may entail, and
guidelines for record keeping of donor information. Second, they may
address the rights of gamete donors in relation to any resulting children.
Third, they may address the rights of donor-conceived children—both in
relation to the donor, and in relation to their half-siblings (i.e. children
born from a mutual gamete donor). These different aspects of the practice
may be governed by several areas of law that “converge in the donor
world,” 17 including family law, constitutional law, privacy law, health
law, and contract law.
A. Regulating Donation
Gamete donation is “an outright, and undoubtedly thriving,
commercial activity” generating “billions of dollars per year,” 18 but, like
many other reproductive practices in the United States, it is largely
unregulated. 19 In the United States Food and Drug Administration’s
(FDA) eligibility requirements for donors, the regulatory threshold for
gamete donation is low,20 requiring a review of the donor’s medical

17. NAOMI CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP: CONSTRUCTING DONOR-CONCEIVED FAMILIES 91
(2013) [hereinafter CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP].
18. Sabatello, supra note 10, at 354.
19. Id. at 353.
20. Id.
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records, and imposing “screening of donated gametes for predominantly
communicable and infectious diseases (e.g., HIV, Hepatitis C), including
six months quarantine and retesting before use of anonymous
donations.” 21 There is no “centralized system” that documents gamete
donations or the children born from specific sperm; donors may thus
donate several times, even in multiple locations. 22 “The regulation of
private fertility clinics and gamete banks by individual states is also often
lacking, and among those that have crafted regulations—there is great
variation as to the collection, preservation, and release of donors’
information.” 23
Over the years many scholars have raised concerns over the risks this
lack of regulatory oversight poses to the health and safety of donors and
of donor-conceived children. 24 This includes the risk of incest, as these
children will have no way of knowing whether half-siblings exist, much
less have any way to identify them. 25 Such criticism is often followed by
recommendations for improving the standard of genetic testing
performed on donors, 26 creating a central registry of children born
through sperm donation, and limiting the number of children born
through an individual donor’s gametes. 27 Other calls for further
regulation are grounded in the rights of donor-conceived children, and
the “welfare-related” harms that may occur when these children are
denied information about their genetic origin. 28
In the absence of regulatory guidance, sperm banks, fertility clinics,
and other institutions providing reproductive services may develop their
own policies and guidelines for carrying out sperm donations. 29 As
illustrated by Teuscher’s case, agreements with such service providers
attempt to regulate and control the ability of donors and recipients to
exchange information. These institutions may also decide to limit a
recipient’s access to sperm vials under certain circumstances or to allow
sperm donors to withdraw consent to the future use of their gametes.

21. Id.
22. Id. at 354.
23. Id. at 353.
24. CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP, supra note 17, at 151.
25. See generally Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line—Or the Curtain?—For
Reproductive Technology, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 59 (2009).
26. Charles A. Sims et al., Genetic Testing of Sperm Donors: Survey of Current Practices, 94
FERTILITY & STERILITY 126, 129 (2010).
27. See CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP, supra note 17, at 151–60 (discussing the promotion of donor
health and safety); see generally Sabatello, supra note 10.
28. Sabatello, supra note 10, at 357–58.
29. See generally Katherine M. Johnson, Making Families: Organizational Boundary Work in
U.S. Egg and Sperm Donation, 99 SOC. SCI. & MED. 64 (2013).
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B. Rights of Gamete Donors
Similarly, no unified framework governs the rights of donors in
relation to their prospective offspring. There is no federal legislation that
determines parentage, but rather a set of “jumbled, incomplete” state laws
that address different scenarios involving sperm donation. 30 The most
common scenario addressed in these state laws involve situations in
which a married woman uses Artificial Insemination (AI) to become a
parent, using either a known or unknown sperm donor. 31 In this scenario,
in order for her husband to become the child’s legal parent, “a doctor
must supervise the insemination, the husband must consent in writing to
the insemination, and the physician must file the husband’s consent with
the state health department.” 32 Only after these requirements have been
satisfied will the donor’s legal rights in relation to the child be
terminated. 33
The picture is more complicated in cases involving single women. The
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), originally silent about this scenario, now
states more broadly that “[a] donor is not a parent of a child conceived by
assisted reproduction.” 34 While only a minority of states adopted the
2017 UPA, it appears that most do terminate the parental rights of
unknown sperm donors. 35 When it comes to known sperm donors,
however, states approach legal parentage in a variety of ways that reflect
their attitudes as to whether biology, intent, marriage, and contract might
constitute the appropriate source of family identity. 36 The cases that arise
under this type of regulation usually involve agreements that set out to
determine the level of involvement, if any, the sperm donor will have in
the child’s life. Whether these contracts are enforceable depends on “state
laws concerning how artificial insemination must be performed and
whether there is explicit statutory recognition of these contracts.” 37
C. Rights of Donor-Conceived Children
As one scholar noted in this particular context, “the U.S. legal system
makes only little room for children’s rights.” 38 Indeed, the “U.S. neither
ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child nor
30. NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL
REGULATION 88–89 (2009) [hereinafter CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES].
31. Id. at 88–90.
32. Id. at 90.
33. Id.
34. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
35. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 30, at 87–90.
36. Id. at 95.
37. Id. at 92.
38. Sabatello, supra note 10, at 357–58.
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includes any mention of children as subjects of rights in its
Constitution.” 39 Parental prerogative, on the other hand, has been granted
constitutional protection through a series of Supreme Court decisions
recognizing parents’ right to the “care, custody and control” of their
children. 40 This characteristic of the legal system begins to explain the
hold that donor anonymity continues to have in the American
reproductive market, since “asserting a separate right on behalf of the
minor child, such as the right to know a donor . . . [,] realistically requires
the willingness to recognize tensions with established parental decisionmaking rights.” 41 This is also true for the right to contact a half-sibling,
which is a relatively new development in the conceptualization of donorconceived children’s rights. Both rights underlie calls to regulate gamete
donation in ways that recognize the relationships formed within what law
professor Naomi Cahn refers to as “donor-conceived family
communities” or “donor kin families or networks.” 42
These and other calls for additional regulatory oversight of sperm
donation intensify as the use of at-home DNA tests and online sibling
registries become more and more prevalent, allowing for the discovery of
these genetic relations and the formation of new kinds of families.43
These developments are undermining some long-held principles, such as
donor anonymity, 44 but also give rise to real, emotionally-laden conflicts
between the parties involved in this practice, be it donors, recipients,
donor-conceived children, or service providers.
II. DOE V. MINISTRY OF HEALTH
A. Background: The Israeli Legal Framework
Unlike the United States, Israel’s reproductive practices and related
services operate under greater oversight and control. 45 Sperm donation in
particular is regulated through public health regulations and circulars
39. Id. at 358.
40. CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP, supra note 17, at 96–97.
41. Id. at 97; Sabatello, supra note 10, at 357–58.
42. CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP, supra note 17, at 3.
43. See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha, 44 Siblings and Counting, WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/health/44-donor-siblings-and-counting/?utm_
term=.17086994aa32 [https://perma.cc/XK5B-ZVVJ] (discussing the government’s attempts to
regulate the growing number of donor-conceived births and the problems they impose).
44. See, e.g., Guido Pennings, Genetic Databases and the Future of Donor Anonymity, 34 HUM.
REPROD. 786, 786 (2019) (discussing how genetic databases increase the risk of donor anonymity
and threaten the long-held principle of privacy in gamete donation).
45. See, e.g., Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli, Thirty-Five Years of Assisted Reproductive
Technologies in Israel, 2 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE & SOC’Y ONLINE 16, 17 (2016) (outlining how,
since 1982, the Israeli government has exercised great control over establishing reproductive
technologies and guidelines).
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issued by Israel’s Health Ministry Director-General, 46 the last of which
was circulated in 2007. 47 These and other public health regulations set
the general framework for the establishment of sperm banks and
operation of artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization. 48
According to the regulations, sperm banks require the approval of the
Health Ministry Director General; and such approval is given only to
sperm banks operating in and as a part of hospitals. 49 Artificial
insemination may be performed only in such hospitals and only with
sperm units received from that particular bank. 50
Eligible donors must be single men (not widowed or divorced),
preferably between the ages of eighteen to thirty, who have not previously
donated sperm. 51 Donors are financially compensated directly by the
sperm bank. 52 Candidates must undergo genetic testing for several
genetically transmitted diseases as part of the process of becoming sperm
donors. 53 This process also entails several interviews in which the
candidate is asked about his medical history, social background, and
education. 54 The donor then signs a “donor card,” 55 which includes his
physical examination test results and a description of his appearance; he
also signs a personal statement and confidentiality agreement, stating that
he consents to the use of his sperm and renounces access to any details
about the recipient. 56 These forms do not address the possibility of a
52F

53F

54F

5F

56F

46. People’s Health Regulations (Sperm Bank), 5739–1979, KT 3996 p. 1448 (Isr.) [hereinafter
Sperm Bank Regulations]. The Circulars of the Director General of the Ministry of Health are
issued thereunder.
47. AVI ISRAELI, MINISTRY OF HEALTH, RULES REGARDING THE MANAGEMENT OF A SPERM
BANK AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR PERFORMING ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION (2007) [hereinafter
CIRCULAR ON SPERM BANKS].
48. People’s Health Regulations (IVF), 5747–1987, KT 5035 p. 987 (Isr.) [hereinafter IVF
Regulations]. Pursuant to these regulations, two circulars have been distributed setting the rules
under which in vitro fertilization using the sperm from a non-anonymous sperm donor can be
performed.
49. Sperm Bank Regulations, supra note 46, at § 2.
50. Id.
51. Sperm Donation—Sperm Banks, MINISTRY HEALTH, https://www.health.gov.il/
English/Topics/fertility/Pages/sperm-bank.aspx [https://perma.cc/2F8W-EZ2N].
52. Id. These payments may vary, depending on the attractiveness of the donor in terms of, for
example, education and physical characteristics. However, these generally range between $100–
$2000 per donation.
53. Id. The donor must also agree “to let his DNA be retained for future tests, if these may be
necessary.” Id.
54. Id.
55. CIRCULAR ON SPERM BANKS, supra note 47, at § 9(a).
56. Id. at § 9(b).
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donor withdrawing his consent. Sperm donors are barred from making
any additional donations in another bank. 57
Eligible recipients are women, whether single or married, who want to
become parents through an anonymous sperm donation. 58 Each recipient
must sign a “recipient card,” which includes details of her familial
situation, any preference she and her spouse (if there is one) might have
about the donor’s appearance, 59 and a consent form for artificial
insemination using a donor’s sperm. 60 Recipients are also able to
purchase additional units of sperm from the same donor for future use,
which are kept at the sperm bank for an annual fee. 61
To resolve legal paternity, in cases where the sperm recipient is
married, the husband must sign an affidavit declaring that he will be
considered the father of the future child “for all intents and purposes,”
including inheritance and alimony. 62 In practice, however, “the husband
is registered as the child’s father, and the donation is usually a secret
shared by the couple and kept from the offspring themselves as well as
from all other parties.” 63 In the case of a known sperm donor, the circular
states that both parties must enter into an agreement where the donor
consents to the process and acknowledges his duties toward any resulting
child, regardless of what he and the recipient may have agreed to
separately. 64
Over the years since this practice became legally available, the Israeli
reproductive regulators received calls to reverse its mandated anonymity
57. Sperm Donation—Sperm Banks, supra note 51. To control this aspect of the practice, a
national registry run by the health ministry documents only the donors’ information. CIRCULAR ON
SPERM BANKS, supra note 47, at § 13.
58. At first, the regulatory framework differentiated between married and single women by
requiring unmarried women to be evaluated by a psychiatrist and a social worker to determine their
eligibility for sperm donation. The case was settled after the state agreed to nullify these rules. See
generally Judy Siegel-Itzkovich, Israeli Court Overturns IVF Treatment Rules, 314 BMJ 538
(1997).
59. CIRCULAR ON SPERM BANKS, supra note 47, at § 9(c).
60. Id. at § 23(a)–(b).
61. This possibility is also constructed through a form signed by the recipient and the sperm
bank titled “Sperm Reservation Form.”
62. CIRCULAR ON SPERM BANKS, supra note 47, at § 23(a)–(b). In 1980, the Israeli Supreme
Court had to decide a case on a question not covered by the regulations, namely whether a husband
who had given his consent to insemination procedures was liable for child support for the child
conceived by sperm donation from a stranger. The Court ruled on contractual grounds that the
husband was liable, without ever ruling on the question of fatherhood. As a principled solution for
this matter, the above-mentioned consent forms for spouses were changed to include explicit
undertaking of full legal responsibility over a child by the male spouse. See generally CA 449/79
Salameh v. Salameh 34(2) PD 779 (1980) (Isr.).
63. M. Wygoda, The Influence of Jewish Law on Israeli Regulation of Sperm Banks, 5 ETHICS,
MED. & PUB. HEALTH 116, 118 (2018). In cases of children born to a single woman, there is no
official registration of their paternal biological origin. Id.
64. CIRCULAR ON SPERM BANKS, supra note 47, at § 31.
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in sperm donation. These calls were similarly grounded in a concern for
donor-conceived children’s rights to know their genetic origin. 65 Vardit
Ravitsky, a proponent of disclosure, recently argued that “novel
technologies such as mitochondrial replacement and even gene editing
raise new concerns in this area and may expand the scope of such a
right.” 66 Such calls have not materialized into legislative action to date,
even though the Israeli legal system has come to recognize children as
holding rights of their own, 67 for example, by endorsing the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 68
Finally, while the Israeli framework is rather comprehensive,
especially when compared to its American counterpart, it is nonetheless
based on administrative rules rather than primary legislation. This affects
the validity of those regulations, if challenged. More importantly, without
the formal deliberation process that characterizes primary legislation,
these regulations leave unattended many issues that arise in this
reproductive context, as illustrated by the case below. 69
65F

6F

67F

68F

B. The Case
In 2010, forty-three-year-old Doe, a single mother living in Florida,
gave birth to her first-born daughter conceived through an anonymous
sperm donation. 70 Following the birth of her daughter, Doe purchased the
option to use five additional sperm units from the same donor, to be kept
at the Rambam Medical Center in Haifa, Israel, for an annual fee. 71 On
December 1, 2011, the sperm bank received a letter from the donor stating
65. Ruth Zafran, “Secrets And Lies”—The Right of AID Offspring to Seek Out Their Biological
Fathers, 35 MISHPATIM [HEBREW U. L.J.] 519, 532 (2005); Vardit Ravitsky, The Right to Know
One’s Genetic Origins and Cross-Border Medically Assisted Reproduction, 6 ISR. J. HEALTH
POL’Y RES. 1, 1 (2017).
66. Ravitsky, supra note 65, at 1.
67. See generally Tamar Morag, Children’s Rights in Israeli Case Law: A Spiral Progression,
28 ISR. STUD. REV. 282 (2013) (discussing how the Israeli Supreme Court worked to develop
children’s rights following the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in the early
1990s).
68. See generally G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Sept. 2, 1990),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx [https://perma.cc/
6AQW-FNQY] (outlining the rights of children ratified by the United Nations in the early 1990s).
69. The growing popularity of artificial insemination from a donor in Israel and the ethical
questions this reproductive practice raises have made pressing the need for unified and exhaustive
legislation. In 2016, a proposed bill titled “Sperm Banks Law” was distributed by the Ministry of
Health addressing several aspects of sperm donation that are left unresolved by the circulars, such
as the number of women that may use the same donor, the disposition of sperm after the donor has
died, and the establishment of a national database for children born through sperm donation. To
date, however, the bill has not been made into law. Wygoda, supra note 63, at 122–23.
70. The Doe Case, supra note 16, at 6.
71. Id. Doe held both Israeli and American citizenships and had been a resident of the Unites
States for seventeen years when filing her petition.
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that he wished to discontinue any further use of his past sperm donations,
because, among other reasons, he had become a ba’al teshuva (i.e., he
had embraced the religious ultra-orthodox lifestyle). 72 Shortly after
receiving the letter, the bank notified Doe that she would no longer be
able to use the additional sperm units she had reserved. 73 Doe requested
that the donation not be destroyed, and that she be allowed to exhaust
other legal avenues. 74 Doe then filed a petition with the Israeli Supreme
Court against the respondents—The Health Ministry and The Sperm
Bank—challenging the sperm bank’s decision to deny her access to the
additional sperm units. 75
Very early on in the proceedings, the Israeli Supreme Court framed
Doe as a case that could be decided through both a public and a private
prism. 76 The Court noted that the case raised questions touching on
numerous juridical fields such as contract, property, and administrative
law. 77 Specifically, it saw that the legal issue in question could be
resolved through both a contractual analysis and a rights-based (or
balancing-of-interests) analysis. 78
The litigating parties included elements of both of these approaches in
their claims and arguments. Doe’s claims, for example, focused on the
infringement of her right to parenthood, 79 but also on the contractual
relationships established between the parties—a relationship that was
based in principle on the consent forms both she and the donor had signed
with the sperm bank. 80
All three residing Justices offered analyses that differed to some
degree, but all were at least willing to recognize the forms signed by the
litigating parties—the sperm bank, the donor, and Doe—as establishing
some form of a valid contractual relationship among them. Writing the
opinion of the Court, Justice Elyakim Rubinstein nevertheless found that
“the most appropriate and correct perspective for a ruling on the issue”
was through an analysis of the conflicting rights and interests that were

72. Id.
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id. at 6.
75. Id. at 10. The petition was initially filed against the Ministry of Health and the Sperm Bank.
Later, the Court joined the donor as a respondent and requested that he respond to the petition.
76. Id. at 11 (“As we have noted at the outset, this case raises questions of numerous fields of
law. The issue may be looked at through the prism of contract law, property law, and, naturally,
from the angle of administrative law. Each one of these perspectives may serve as fruitful grounds
for a rich and innovative discussion.”).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 11–12, 31.
79. Id. at 7.
80. Id. at 8.
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at stake for both the donor and the recipient. 81 He then balanced the
donor’s wish not to be a father against Doe’s interest in conceiving
children who share the same genetic constitution, 82 eventually finding
that “precedence should be afforded to the donor’s position and to his
personal autonomy.” 83
The Israeli Court’s reasoning will be discussed below in greater detail.
However, note that by drawing on Doe the purpose here is not to suggest
that the Israeli Supreme Court’s analysis should be applied in Teuscher’s
case, as these arise in different legal contexts. What is more, the
circumstances that led the Washington sperm bank to deny Danielle
Teuscher access to her reserved vials differ from those in the Israeli
example in that the recipient, and not the donor, is the one to have
breached the contract she had entered with the bank. Rather, in the
following paragraphs I use the Israeli example in order to identify some
of the questions this novel type of reproductive dispute involving an
anonymous sperm donation may give rise to. I then consider how these
questions might be answered in the American legal context.
III. POSSIBLE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
Over the past two decades, two prevailing approaches for resolving
reproductive disputes have gained a foothold, both of them introduced
and developed in the context of frozen pre-embryo disposition disputes.
The most famous among those is the 1992 case, Davis v. Davis. 84 This
Part provides a general description of each approach and how it applies
to a dispute over an anonymous donor’s sperm vials.
A. The Contractual Approach
After exhausting several other paths to parenthood, Junior Lewis Davis
and Mary Sue Davis decided to undergo in vitro fertilization (IVF)
treatments in order conceive a child. 85 Several attempts at IVF over a
period of three years did not result in a pregnancy. 86 Before another
transfer could be attempted, but after the couple opted to cryogenically
preserve four pre-embryos, Junior Davis filed for divorce. 87 During the
divorce proceedings it became clear that the couple disagreed over the
81. Id. at 11.
82. Id. at 26.
83. Id. at 4.
84. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (discussing which divorced spouse
should have custody of the frozen embryos), aff’d on reh’g, 1992 WL 341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23,
1992).
85. Id. at 591.
86. Id. at 591–92.
87. Id. at 592.
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disposition of their pre-embryos: Mary Sue sought to donate the preembryos to a childless couple (at least at that point in time), while Junior
Davis wanted them to be discarded. In its decision, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee discussed two alternative paths for the resolution of the dispute
before it, the “Enforceability of Contract” 88 and “Balancing the Parties’
Interests.” 89
Under a contractual approach, the court will examine the agreements
the parties have entered into, either with one another or with a fertility
clinic in which the pre-embryos, or gametes, are in storage. More
specifically, the court will look to honor any agreement that manifests the
parties’ intentions regarding the disposition of the pre-embryos. Ideally,
there would be an independent dispositional agreement, drafted and
signed by the parties, in which they both explicitly expressed their
dispositional choices in the event of divorce or other contingencies. In
reality, however, service providers (e.g. fertility clinics) “require couples
undergoing IVF to sign a cryopreservation consent or agreement. . . .
These documents vary in their particulars, but typically ask patients to
choose from a number of options for disposition under a variety of
contingencies, such as death, divorce, or abandonment of the embryos.”90
Courts have also considered whether an oral or an implied agreement can
mandate a certain dispositional choice. 91
In the context of anonymous sperm donation, a contractual analysis is
similarly likely to be based on the consent forms the donor and recipient
have each signed with the sperm bank. 92 These forms may or may not
include provisions detailing the circumstances under which donors may
withdraw consent for the use of their gametes at a later date. 93 This is true
for both the form or agreement signed by the donor and that signed by the
recipient upon receiving the donation and/or reserving additional vials for
future use. More often than not, however, “[m]en who donate sperm
through a sperm bank typically relinquish their rights without time limits.
Nor are they offered the opportunity to revoke consent to use of the sperm
at a later date, though clinics have on occasion honored a request by the

88. Id. at 597.
89. Id. at 603.
90. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic Consent Forms Are Not
the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAWS. 57, 58–59 (2011) [hereinafter Forman, Clinic
Consent Forms].
91. See generally Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1147–53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); Davis,
842 S.W.2d 588.
92. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce & Family Law Contracting: A Model for
Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 396 (2013) [hereinafter Forman, Enforceability].
93. Id. at 401.
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donor to no longer sell the sperm.” 94 This seems odd considering how
changes in one’s personal circumstances may affect their decision to act
as an anonymous sperm donor. 95 Indeed, some countries have long
protected a donors’ right to withdraw consent to the use of their gametes,
including the United Kingdom, which has done so since 1991. 96
In a contractual analysis of anonymous sperm donation, courts must
also consider the lack of a direct contractual relationship between the
donors and recipients. As illustrated both in Teuscher’s case and in Doe,
there is no “contractual adversary” between the donor and the recipient.97
At least in the latter case, Doe did try to argue that she was a third party
to the contract entered into by the donor and sperm bank; 98 however, the
Court rejected this claim. 99
B. The Balancing Test Approach
The court in Davis v. Davis decided to resolve the case by balancing
the various rights at stake for Mary Sue Davis and for Junior Davis. In
doing so, the court considered “the positions of the parties, the
significance of their interests, and the relative burdens that will be
imposed by differing resolutions.” 100
In that particular instance, while the case was moving through the
lower courts, Mary Sue had intended to use the pre-embryos herself; but
by the time the Supreme Court of Tennessee was considering the case,
she had changed her mind, instead asking to donate them to a childless
couple. 101 Junior was “adamantly opposed to such donation” and wanted
the frozen pre-embryos discarded. 102 The court weighed the couple’s
competing interests under each of these scenarios, and found that in both
instances Junior’s right not to procreate would prevail. 103
Most reproductive disputes, and certainly that in Teuscher’s case,
present the court with a similar task of balancing different aspects of

94. Id. This is also true for procedures such as the “cryopreservation (freezing) of gametes and
embryos to provide treatment options for excess reproductive tissues and to aid with fertility
preservation.” Cynthia E. Fruchtman, Withdrawal of Cryopreserved Sperm, Eggs, and Embryos,
48 FAM. L.Q. 197, 197 (2014).
95. Guido Pennings & Veerle Provoost, The Attitude of Female Students Towards Sperm
Donation by Their Partner, 36 J. ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS 1431, 1432 (2019).
96. Peter D. Sozou et al., Withdrawal of Consent by Sperm Donors, 339 BMJ 975, 975 (2009).
97. The Doe Case, supra note 16, at 54.
98. Id. at 8.
99. Id. at 31.
100. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting the discussion in the
balancing the parties’ interests), aff’d on reh’g, 1992 WL 341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992).
101. Id. at 590.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 604.
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procreative autonomy. 104 In Doe, the fact that procreative rights were at
stake was central to the Israeli Court’s decision to choose the balancing
test approach over the contractual one. It found that “intimate questions
of human life” deserve a constitutional analysis of the rights at stake,105
and rejected the proposition that the “case of sperm donation attests to a
choice to follow a . . . ‘businesslike’ or ‘financial’” path to parenthood,
“of the type that grants security that is not extant in an intimate set of
understandings.” 106
These determinations about the centrality of procreative decisions to
the lives of individuals allude to some principal arguments against the
application of the contractual approach to resolve reproductive disputes,
which will be discussed below. For now, note that applying the balancing
test requires answering at least two more questions: first, about the rights
each party to the reproductive dispute has at stake; and second, about the
harms that may flow from infringing upon these rights. These two
questions will be discussed in turn.
IV. THE RIGHTS AT STAKE
It follows from the overview of the balancing test approach, that before
such a test can be used to weigh the conflicting rights at stake, these rights
need to be identified. Even more fundamental, understanding the nature
of the rights at stake may be an integral part of deciding which of the
approaches is the best approach to apply to begin with. As discussed later
on, classifying the right not to become a parent as inalienable, for
example, may lead a court to reject the contractual approach and to
employ the balancing test instead. 107 This section looks at several ways
in which the rights of the parties may be framed, in each case possibly
leading to considerably different results.
A. The Right Not to Procreate
In a series of Supreme Court cases dating back to 1942, procreative
liberty has been constitutionally recognized through case law identifying
marriage and procreation as fundamental rights. 108 A “zone of privacy

104. See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Beyond Balancing: Rethinking the Law of Embryo Disposition, 68
AM. U. L. REV. 515, 518 (2018) (exploring the history of the balancing test in the context of
abortion law).
105. The Doe Case, supra note 16, at 27.
106. Id. at 19.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that
sterilization as punishment for stealing was unconstitutional); see generally Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees,” 109 the Court
explained, provides individuals with a right “to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 110 Developed primarily
through cases addressing the use of contraceptives, this zone is generally
understood to encompass both the right to procreate and the right not to
procreate.
Following this basic premise, at least in the context of pre-embryo
disputes, “courts and commentators have invoked a monolithic ‘right not
to procreate.’” 111 For example in Reber v. Reiss, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court had to decide who should receive the thirteen pre-embryos
Bret Reber and Andrea Reiss created after the latter was diagnosed with
breast cancer. 112 The couple separated and then divorced, but could not
agree over the disposition of the pre-embryos. 113 In ruling for the wife
(who otherwise could not have become a genetic parent), the court
analyzed the husband’s interest in “avoiding unwanted procreation.”114
In response to the husband’s concerns about the financial responsibility
he may bear toward the resulting child and the level of involvement he
may have in the child’s life, the court explained that he would be relieved
of any financial obligation and could choose whether to be part of their
life or not. 115 Nevertheless, it did not consider how these different
scenarios might interfere with different aspects of his procreational
liberty. Indeed, in most of these cases state courts have ruled in favor of
the party claiming the right not to procreate, relying on the
abovementioned Supreme Court cases. 116
Critical of this monolithic view of the right not to procreate, Professor
I. Glenn Cohen developed a competing framework that identifies “a
bundle of rights having multiple possible sticks, consisting of a right not
to be a gestational, legal, and genetic parent.” 117 According to this
framework, pre-embryo disposition disputes typically present a conflict
between “her right to be a genetic, gestational, and legal parent” and “his
109. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
110. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
111. Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 15, at 1118; see also I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution
and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1136–37 (2008) (arguing that authorities
“err by relying on a monolithic conception of the right not to procreate”) [hereinafter Cohen, The
Constitution].
112. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1132–33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1140.
115. Id. at 1140–42.
116. I. Glenn Cohen & Eli Y. Adashi, Embryo Disposition Disputes: Controversies and Case
Law, 46 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13, 14 (2016); Cohen, The Constitution, supra note 111, at 1137–38.
117. Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 15, at 1121.
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right not to be a genetic (and possibly legal) parent.” 118 Following the
same logic, a case of anonymous sperm donation would likely present a
conflict between the right to be a genetic, gestational, and legal parent
and the right not to be a genetic parent. 119
In Doe, which involved an anonymous sperm donor, the Israeli Court
similarly considered the different possible “fatherly contexts,” noting that
under a regime of anonymity, “the donor owes no financial, social or
other duty to the infant.” 120 In fact, the Court explained, “it is not at all
clear if and how the donor would know that he became a father, since, as
aforesaid, this is subject to the success of the medical procedure, and
without an inquiry on his part he will not learn about it.” 121 But even
though the Court held that it was not the “core” right not to be a parent
that was at stake, it nonetheless found the “genetic element of
parenthood” to be constitutionally protected under Israeli law by the right
of autonomy. 122
In the United States, it is still unclear whether the “naked” right not to
be a genetic parent should be granted the status of a constitutionally
protected right. At least according to Cohen, the answer is no. Supreme
Court decisions on access to contraception and abortion, he posits, should
not be seen as recognizing a fundamental constitutional right not to be a
genetic parent. 123 Instead, they should be viewed as “establishing a
fundamental right against state interference with the collective decision
of both parties to prevent procreation but not a right by one party as
against the other party to prevent procreation.” 124 According to Cohen,
neither does abortion jurisprudence recognize an overarching right not be
a genetic parent, since it is concerned with the right not to be a gestational
parent and with freedom against bodily intrusion. 125 This line of
reasoning suggests that “an individual does not violate the Constitution
118. Cohen, The Constitution, supra note 111, at 1144.
119. This characterization of the conflicting rights assumes, first, that the sperm recipient
intends on gestating the pregnancy herself rather than use a surrogate. And second, that the state
regulatory framework governing parentage allows for sperm donors to be relinquished of their
parental obligations. As discussed in Part I above, at least when it comes to single persons using an
anonymous donation, most states do terminate the parental rights of the donors.
120. The Doe Case, supra note 16, at 22.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Cohen, The Constitution, supra note 111, at 1154.
124. Id. This argument raises several questions that I do not discuss in this article, concerned
with the type of actions procreative rights protect individuals from, such as private or state actions.
According to Cohen, “enforcement of agreements to become a genetic parent, such as . . .
agreements to provide sperm or egg, over contemporaneous objection, does not constitute state
action raising a constitutional issue.” Id. at 1174. This is another argument Cohen makes against
treating the right not to be a genetic parent as a fundamental right.
125. Id. at 1154–65.
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by making another individual a genetic (but only genetic) parent against
his or her will.” 126 Therefore, a court might be able to compel, for
example, Danielle Teuscher’s sperm donor to become a genetic parent
even though he later withdrew consent to the use of his sperm.
Whether courts decide to embrace this framework or not, an important
first step is to recognize and differentiate among the elements of parental
rights that are at stake, and only then turn to the process of balancing them
against the other. This is especially true in the context of sperm donation,
which relies on the law’s ability to acknowledge models of parenthood
other than that of genetic parenthood.
B. The Right to Procreate
When considering the right to procreate, in the context of sperm
donation, the question is which procreative right a recipient would
exercise when attempting to use a specific donor’s sperm. One answer to
this question is that all elements of the right to procreate are at stake, since
in most cases recipients wish to become genetic, legal, and gestational
parents. 127 Thus, denying them access to the sperm of their choice
interferes with each of these rights. Another way to answer this question
is to consider whether the recipient could possibly become a genetic,
legal, and/or gestational parent through means other than the disputed
sperm.
Although most courts resolving pre-embryo disputes have opted for
the latter, 128 distinguishing these answers highlights the difficulty of
determining the scope of the right to procreate. This is due in part to the
development of reproductive technologies that provide novel ways to
exercise this right. 129 As one scholar noted in this context, “[i]n a preART world, procreation was fundamentally (perhaps irrevocably) linked
to sexual activity.” 130 Despite the prevalence of assisted reproduction as
an accepted form of procreation, “courts and legislatures have continued
to shy away from explicit consideration of the nature of the right to
procreate with technological assistance.” 131 This area is also relatively
undertheorized within scholarly writing. 132
126. Id. at 1167.
127. For male recipients, the rights at stake are limited to the first two.
128. See, e.g., Findley v. Lee, No. FDI-13-780539, at 61–65 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2016),
(considering that the Respondent has not established that she is infertile at the age of forty-six but
she has established that she has between a 0 to 5 percent chance of a live birth).
129. See generally Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Procreative Pluralism, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER,
L. & JUST. 22 (2015).
130. Id. at 56.
131. Id. at 24–25.
132. See, e.g., id.; Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. &
DEV. J. 1 (2007).
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While a discussion over the meaning of the right to procreate is beyond
the scope of this article, one basic question that has yet to be thoroughly
answered is whether procreative liberty extends to donor-assisted
reproduction. According to Professor John Robertson, 133 the answer is
yes.
The couple’s interest in reproducing is the same, no matter how
conception occurs, for the values and interests underlying coital
reproduction are equally present. Both coital and noncoital conception
enable the couple to unite egg and sperm and thus acquire a child of
their genes and gestation for rearing . . . . The use of noncoital
techniques such as IVF or artificial insemination to unite egg and
husband’s sperm, made necessary by the couple’s infertility, should
then also be protected. 134

Such an extensive view of procreative liberty has been criticized for
reading too much into the US Supreme Court decision in Skinner v.
Oklahoma; as some suggest, recognizing a negative right to procreate
“does not imply a positive right to call upon the apparatus of the state for
assistance in procreation.” 135 Furthermore,
even if Skinner does create a constitutional right to be free from state
interference with the use of reproductive technology, it does not follow
that the state possesses an affirmative obligation to assure the exercise
of procreative choice by placing its prestige and power behind the
enforcement of preconception contracts. 136

Even assuming that the right to procreate extends to assisted
reproduction, a further question is whether that right encompasses the
right to procreate using the gametes of a specific donor. As suggested
above, if cases that involve pre-embryo disputes are any indication,
analysis of the right to procreate has been concerned with the general
133. Of the scholars that did grapple with this question over the years, John A. Robertson has
been particularly prolific, repeatedly arguing that the protected right to procreate includes the right
to use assisted reproduction. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and
the Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 914 (1996) (“Since an infertile couple or individual has the
same interest in bearing and rearing offspring as a fertile couple does, their right to use noncoital
techniques to treat infertility should have equivalent respect.”); see John A. Robertson, Gay and
Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 328 (2004)
(“If coital reproduction is protected, then we might reasonably expect the courts to protect the right
of infertile persons to use noncoital means of reproduction to combine their gametes, such as
artificial insemination (AI), in vitro fertilization (IVF), and related techniques.”); see also John A.
Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New
Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 956 n.53 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Embryos, Families]
(“Thus, persons desiring to reproduce may have a right to receive gametes and gestation from
others, even if the others have no independent right to provide those services.”).
134. Robertson, Embryos, Families, supra note 133, at 960.
135. Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1473, 1485 (1995)
(reviewing JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES (1994)).
136. Id.
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ability to become a parent, by any means, not with the choice of some
particular sperm. Indeed, in Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted
that Mary Sue Davis could “achieve parenthood in all its aspects—
genetic, gestational, bearing, and rearing” through IVF. 137 The court
suggested that it would have been a closer call if she was seeking to use
the pre-embryos herself, but only if she could not become a parent by any
means other than the disputed pre-embryos. 138 Put differently, the court
might have weighed her right to procreate differently in relation to
Junior’s interest in avoiding parenthood if it would implicate her ability
to become a parent at all. The court did not, however, confront the
specific question of whether the right to assisted procreation is
constitutionally protected in the context of pre-embryo disputes. 139
Similar reasoning runs through the Doe decision, where the Israeli
Supreme Court expressed reservations about a broad interpretation of the
right to procreate. 140 Specifically, the Court posited that Doe’s “core”
right to parenthood was not at stake, since her overall ability to become a
parent was still available; Doe was “healthy and fit to bring a child into
this world and is not bound . . . to the Donor in the case at bar. She is able
to act soon to receive another sperm donation at her preferred timing for
undergoing additional insemination treatments.” 141 Against her claim
that “impingement upon the ability to choose with whom to bring
children into this world is sufficient in order to be sheltered by the legal
right to parenthood,” the Court reiterated that “at most” her interest in
using the sperm of this particular anonymous donor is protected by her
right to autonomy, though it was “highly doubtful.” 142 Framing the right
she claimed as a “right to a child having a specific genetic constitution,”
the Court held that in these circumstances, her interest “is not recognized
by law and is not protectable.” 143

137. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992), aff’d on reh’g, 1992 WL 341632
(Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992).
138. Id.
139. Another differentiation that I do not make here is between negative and positive rights. In
the context of assisted conception, a negative right would protect against interference with
accessing reproductive practices such as sperm donation or surrogacy, while a positive right would
require the state or other individuals to provide the means, such as funding, needed in order to
engage with them. See, e.g., Robertson, Embryos, Families, supra note 133, at 966 n.83
(“[P]rocreative liberty is (like most constitutional rights) a negative—not a positive—right.”).
140. Again, to be clear, the purpose here is not to suggest that the Israeli Supreme Court’s
framing of the right should be employed in the American context as well. Rather, it is to get a sense
of the nuances and unique considerations the case of sperm donation brings to the discussion over
the right to procreate.
141. The Doe Case, supra note 16, at 18.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 18–19, 26.
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In the American context, where one’s reproductive decisions are
protected by a zone of privacy, there is perhaps more merit to the claim
that Danielle Teuscher’s fundamental reproductive liberty is at stake;
because she had already used the sperm once to conceive a child, denying
her access to the reserved vials does amount to interfering with her
reproductive plans. Still, in a more recent case, the Colorado Court of
Appeals found that the wife’s interest in having a fourth child who carried
the same genetic constituency as her other children was outweighed by
the husband’s “corresponding and equal rights . . . to determine that he
does not want to have additional children who are joint genetic offspring
of husband and wife.” 144 This decision was later reversed and remanded
by the Colorado Supreme Court. While the court did not directly address
the interest of having children who are “full siblings,” it did find that
while weighing the parties interests at stake “the sheer number of a
party’s existing children, standing alone,” may not be a reason to deny
the requesting party the preservation or use of the pre-embryos. 145 At the
same time, the court made clear that courts should consider “a party’s
demonstrated ability, or inability, to become a genetic parent through
means other than the use of the pre-embryos,” but may not consider
“whether the party seeking to become a genetic parent using the preembryos could instead adopt a child or otherwise parent non-biological
children.” 146
V. REPRODUCTIVE HARMS
Whichever formulation courts decide to use when analyzing the rights
at stake in sperm donation disputes, it is important to also consider how
these rights weigh against one other. In Davis, the court suggested that as
a rule “the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming
that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood
by means other than use of the pre-embryos in question.” 147 In practice,
courts have tended to conduct “a fact-intensive inquiry into each party’s
interest in using or preventing the use of the pre-embryos.” 148
Such case-by-case inquiries are meant to elucidate the harms that
would be imposed on each party to the reproductive dispute, in the
144. In re Marriage of Rooks, 2016 WL 6123561, at *7 (Colo. App. Oct. 20, 2016), rev’d, 429
P.3d 579 (Colo. 2018).
145. In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 581 (Colo. 2018).
146. Id. at 595.
147. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992), aff’d on reh’g, 1992 WL 341632
(Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992).
148. Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1162 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); see also Cohen, Genetic
Parent, supra note 15, at 1144 (suggesting that one mechanism to resolve these conflicts is a
“balancing device,” not at the categorical level, but at the level of a particular case taking into
account idiosyncratic facts that might determine whose interest we should favor).
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context of their life circumstances. 149 As such, this discussion can be
understood as part of the balancing-of-interests analysis. However,
comparing the burdens “that unwanted reproduction . . . would cause the
objecting party, and the burdens that refusing to enforce the agreement”
would cause to the party wishing to use the gametes, is also part of
evaluating the desirability of enforcing such agreements. 150 Separating
this part from the categorical discussion of the conflicting interests gives
rise to several practical insights into the reproductive harms entailed in
Teuscher’s and similar cases.
A. Harm to the Donor
Discussing the harm that would be imposed on the donor if he became
a genetic parent against his wish, the Israeli Supreme Court found that
the
harm to a man, as a result of his feeling . . . that a child who is the fruit
of his loins “walks about the world,” and he is unable or unwilling,
whether on religious grounds or in terms of the resources of time and
emotion, to dedicate his love and attention to him—is inevitable, and
touches upon his subjective moral conscience. 151

These findings were grounded, in part, in a letter the donor addressed
to the Court in which he explained that sperm donation “is presently
incompatible with my world view . . . I am not interested in having a child
born by me, without me being able to give him love, and without me
loving his mother.” 152
Although the Israeli Court framed the harm as particularly grave
considering the donor’s religious lifestyle, quite similar
conceptualizations of the harms that forced genetic parenthood might
impose on individuals are also found in pre-embryo disposition cases in
the US. In Davis, for example, the court explained that “[t]he impact that
this unwanted parenthood would have on Junior Davis can only be
149. While I do not discuss here the interests of children born to a sperm donor in having full
genetic siblings, an argument can be made that having children from the same sperm donor will
benefit the existing child and any future child, rather than having another donor brought into the
family unit. See, e.g., Lucy Frith & Eric Blyth, The Point of No Return: Up to What Point Should
We Be Allowed to Withdraw Consent to the Storage and Use of Embryos and Gametes?, 33
BIOETHICS 637, 640 (2019); Eric Blyth, Steve Lui & Lucy Frith, Relationships and Boundaries
Between Provider and Recipient Families Following Embryo Adoption, 8 FAM. RELATIONSHIPS &
SOC’YS 267 (2017).
150. John A. Robertson, Precommitment Strategies for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 50
EMORY L.J. 989, 1019 (2001) [hereinafter Robertson, Precommitment Strategies].
151. The Doe Case, supra note 16, at 23–24. Statements of this sort feature throughout the
decision, for example: “[I]t is hard for [the donor] to feel that the children to be born by his donation
will not be his children, nor will they have the benefit of his affection, nor will they be the fruit of
his love.” Id. at 24.
152. Id. at 23.
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understood by considering his particular circumstances.” 153 Fifth
youngest of six children, Junior’s parents divorced when he was five
years old. After his mother had a nervous break-down, “he and three of
his brothers went to live at a home for boys run by the Lutheran Church.
From that day forward, he had monthly visits with his mother but saw his
father only three more times before he died in 1976.” 154 These “boyhood
experiences” led the court to conclude that Junior would “face a lifetime
of either wondering about his parental status or knowing about his
parental status but having no control over it.” 155
In both instances, the potential psychological or emotional harms
proved consequential to the courts’ final rulings in favor of the sperm
provider. Similar concerns regarding the consequences of genetic
parenthood are contemplated in arguments against employing the
contractual approach in reproductive disputes, which will be discussed
below. Yet this type of harm can also be conceptualized in general terms,
without reference to one’s particular life circumstances. In the same
article where he offers to unbundle the right not to be a parent into three
separate rights, Professor Cohen also conceives the idea of “attributional
parenthood.” 156 This term refers to a “residual social category of
parenthood” that persists regardless of any financial and care
responsibilities this title may entail. 157 In pre-embryo disputes, Cohen
argues, “three categories of people might nonetheless attribute
parenthood writ large to an individual because of his or her genetic
parenthood of the child: those outside the relationship, the resulting child,
and the individual himself.” 158 This type of emotional distress damage
rests on the convention that connects genetic parenthood and attributional
parenthood. 159
In the context of sperm donation, the extent of the harm attributional
parenthood may impose on the donor may vary from one case to another.
The extent of harm depends on whether, for example, the sperm recipient
decides to disclose the identity of the donor to the future child or other
third parties such as friends and family:
[I]n a regime where one is told whether one’s sperm has been used to
successfully produce a child, but not given the child’s identity (and vice
versa), the sperm provider may perceive himself to be the father of a

153. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603–04 (Tenn. 1992), aff’d on reh’g, 1992 WL 341632
(Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 604.
156. Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 15, at 1134–45.
157. Id. at 1135.
158. Id. at 1136.
159. Id. at 1140–41.
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genetic child he never wanted . . . but he is not forced to confront the
perception by the child or third parties that he is the father. 160

There is, however, room to question the existence of such harm for
anonymous sperm donors, or at least its severity. The decision to become
a donor in the first place means that at some point in their lives, sperm
donors were unbothered by the idea that they would have genetically
related children with whom they would have no relationship or contact.
Indeed, in arguing in favor of “uncoupling” biological and psychological
parenthood in frozen pre-embryo disputes, Professor Ellen Waldman
draws on data about sperm donors to show that “biological ties can exist
absent psychological attachment.” 161 But as Cohen rightly notes, these
studies do not account for cases like Teuscher and Doe, where donors
wished to discontinue further use of their sperm, have knowledge of the
actual past and future use of their sperm, and have lost their anonymity.
Still, recognizing that people have different views about the burden or
obligation that may result from genetic reproduction (and that these views
may change throughout a person’s life), requires careful consideration of
the meaning genetic parenthood in each particular case, rather than basing
decisions on preconceived ideas.
Other harms courts considered in reproductive disputes are financial in
nature. In Findley v. Lee, the California Supreme Court weighed
Findley’s right not to procreate against his ex-wife Lee’s right to
procreate. 162 According to Findley, the only reason Lee wanted to have
these children was to “blackmail and extort money from him in the
future.” 163 Even though the court eventually ruled in favor of Findley, it
rejected this claim because California’s child support system would make
it “highly unlikely” that Lee would be able to extort more money from
him. 164 In the context of sperm donation, this harm is unlikely to carry
much weight either because most states release anonymous sperm donors
from any financial liability toward the resulting child. 165
Becoming a genetic parent, even if it does not carry any legal or
financial liability, may also affect gamete providers’ current or future
relationships. In Szafranski v. Dunston, Jacob Szafranski, the party asking
to discard the pre-embryos that he had created with his ex-girlfriend,
Karla Dunston, grounded his objection in the impact that using them

160. Id. at 1140.
161. Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of Coerced Parenthood in Frozen
Embryo Disputes, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1021 (2004).
162. Findley v. Lee, No. FDI-13-780539, 2016 WL 270083, at *2 (Cal. Super. Jan. 11, 2016).
163. Id. at *33.
164. Id. at *36.
165. See supra Part I.
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would have on his other relationships. 166 Although the couple had no
plans to get married, when Karla was diagnosed with cancer and was
about to lose her fertility, Jacob agreed to provide her with his sperm in
order to create pre-embryos. 167 After the couple separated, Karla wished
to use the pre-embryos, but Jacob objected. 168 In his testimony, Jacob
explained that he already lost one “love interest” because of this legal
dispute and that he was “worried that no one will want to have a
relationship with him knowing that he has fathered a child” under such
circumstances. 169
This concern over the effect of unwanted genetic parenthood on the
donor’s intimate relationships is especially relevant in the context of
anonymous sperm donation, since donors often do not disclose to their
partners the fact that they have donated sperm. One study examining
attitudes about sperm donation found that while the majority of its
respondents would inform and involve their partner in the decision to
donate, “future partners would less often be informed than current
partners.” 170 That same study found that “[a]lmost 40% of the
respondents feared that the donation might have a negative impact on
their current or future relationship.” 171
Indeed, in Doe the donor explained that in the time since he had
provided the donation he got married and had a son, and that he was “not
interested in adding injury to his wife . . . by adding a terrible uncertainty
to their lives.” 172 Still, the Court did not take this particular harm into
account in its decision. In Szafranski, the Illinois Appellate Court held
that Jacob’s concerns are “risks that both parties faced and knowingly
accepted in agreeing to undergo IVF.” 173 The same may be argued with
regard to parties who agreed to donate sperm.
B. Harm to the Recipient
In pre-embryo disposition disputes, the discussion over potential
harms to the party attempting to exercise his or her right to procreate
usually centers on whether that party is able to achieve parenthood
through some means other than the disputed pre-embryos. As explained

166. Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1162 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
167. Id. at 1137–38.
168. Id. at 1136.
169. Id. at 1162.
170. Veerle Provoost, Florence van Rompuy & Guido Pennings, Non-Donors’ Attitudes
Towards Sperm Donation and Their Willingness to Donate, 35 J. ASSISTED REPROD. GENETICS
107, 115 (2018).
171. Id. at 112; see also Pennings & Provoost, supra note 95.
172. The Doe Case, supra note 16, at 10.
173. Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1162.
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above, this harm has been considered most severe if a ruling in favor of
the other party meant that the requesting party would not be able to have
genetic children at all. In Findley v. Lee, discussed above, the California
Supreme Court dedicated most of its analysis of the interests at stake for
Lee to the question whether she “suffers from age-related infertility.”174
After engaging with several studies and with testimony from fertility
doctors, the court concluded that “Lee is unable to establish that she is
now infertile per se. . . . However, the evidence did establish that at best
she has between a 0 to 5 percent chance of a live birth.” 175 In contrast,
where sperm recipients are requesting the use of reserved vials, unless
they were already fertilized, the recipient’s chance of becoming a genetic
parent would not be affected by either granting or denying access to the
reserved sperm. The question of infertility is thus unlikely to arise.
Yet another set of harms concern the health risks that harvesting eggs
and IVF impose on women in particular. 176 While these are irrelevant if
recipients opt to conceive through artificial insemination, they may
nonetheless apply if, for example, a recipient freezes her eggs and
reserves additional sperm vials with the hope of using both of the stored
gametes to produce children in the future.
Sperm donation also does not require the same level of financial
investment that IVF does. “A single vial of sperm can cost $700, and,
depending on insurance coverage, each round of AI performed by a
doctor can cost over $1000, with women typically needing to undergo
numerous rounds of insemination before it is successful.” 177 In
comparison, in 2016, the minimum price of an IVF cycle in the United
States ranged from $12,000 to $15,000. 178 Additional procedures and
tests, including assisted hatching, embryo freezing, and preimplantation
genetic diagnosis can add another $5000 to $15,000 to that price. 179 The
cost of the sperm vials themselves, in addition to the costs associated with
browsing, freezing, and storing may nonetheless amount to thousands of
dollars. 180
174. Findley v. Lee, No. FDI-13-780539, 2016 WL 270083, at *62 (Cal. Super. Jan. 11, 2016).
175. Id. at *65.
176. Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 15, at 1166–69; see also Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d
588, 604 (Tenn. 1992), aff’d on reh’g, 1992 WL 341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992).
177. Lauren Gill, Who’s Your Daddy? Defining Paternity Rights in the Context of Free, Private
Sperm Donation, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1715, 1725–27 (2013).
178. HENRY T. GREELY, THE END OF SEX AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 57–
58 (2016).
179. Id.
180. Gill, supra note 177; see also Brittany Malooly, Why Is Sperm So Damn Expensive?, VICE
(Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/53nvex/why-is-sperm-so-damn-expensive
[https://perma.cc/DL3G-YGY2] (describing the expenses associated with freezing and storing
sperm).
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Notwithstanding the health risks and financial investment sperm
donation may entail, another category of harms centers on intangible or
psychological harms possibly inflicted on sperm recipients if access to
the gametes they reserved is denied. There is, for example, the emotional
investment the recipient made in choosing the donor, which “is often a
stressful and time-consuming process and is usually not a quick or casual
decision.” 181 Although scholarship on people’s experience with choosing
a sperm donor is limited, existing writing points out the complexity of
such decision and the importance some perspective parents attribute to
it. 182 Many women even describe having felt some sense of connection
to a specific donor, which guided them in choosing a donor. 183
To better understand the harms to the sperm recipient, it is perhaps
helpful to consider the harms resulting from what Professor Dov Fox has
called “confounded procreation.” 184 Developed in the context of
reproductive negligence, i.e. the negligent supply of reproductive
services by medical professionals, this term encompasses cases where
plaintiffs ended up with a child having different genetic traits than they
wished for. 185 It happens “when reproductive professionals fertilize
patients with the wrong sperm, implant another couple’s embryos,
misrepresent donor information, or misdiagnose fetuses.” 186 These
“mishaps” result in injury “to reasonable expectations of control over the
selection of offspring particulars that people project would make the
parenting experience more worthwhile for them.” 187 According to Fox
this is particularly true about genetic trait preferences pertaining to the
biological relationships of children to parents, 188 yet it may also be
relevant to the biological relationship between siblings. The existence
and severity of the harm depends on how it may impair their life “from
the perspective of their own (not illegitimate) values and
circumstances.” 189
In the case of sperm donation, there appears to be a preference among
parents and aspiring parents toward using the same sperm donor for their
181. Frith & Blyth, supra note 149, at 639.
182. See, e.g., Sophie Zadeh, Susan Imrie & Andrea M. Braverman, ‘Choosing’ a Donor:
Parents’ Perspectives on Current and Future Donor Information Provision in Clinically Assisted
Reproduction, in REGULATING REPRODUCTIVE DONATION 311 (Susan Golombok et al. eds.,
2016); see also Jennifer Egan, Wanted: A Few Good Sperm, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 19, 2006, at
46 (describing the process women go through when selecting sperm).
183. Egan, supra note 182 (explaining the emotional aspect of choosing a sperm donor).
184. Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 200 (2017).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 201.
187. Id. at 185.
188. Id. at 181.
189. Id. at 226.
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children. Some parents reason that “children with physical resemblances
made it visible to society that the children were siblings and thus that they
were part of the same family.” 190 According to such view, genetic
relatedness is as an indicator of familial relationships. 191 Paradoxically,
“while gamete donation allows for detachment of social parenthood from
biological relatedness,” it also seems to reaffirm biological notions of
kinship. 192 Others want to use the same sperm donor because they believe
that genetic relatedness leads to positive sibling relations. 193 Parents also
cited medical reasons, explaining that children who are full genetic
siblings could donate organs to each other if necessary. 194 These
justifications, however, are not indisputable. For example, there is doubt
whether genetic relatedness does contribute to better sibling relations, or
“that genetic siblings are equally prone (or even more prone) to argue
with each other than non-genetically related siblings.” 195
Lastly, this account of the harm Teuscher may bear as a result of the
sperm bank’s decision will not be complete without considering its
gendered dimensions. As professor Carol Sanger explains in her critical
response to Fox’s article, “many men and women experience procreation
disruptions differently,” and “the measure of disappointment is not
gender neutral.” 196 For example, women struggling with infertility are
“more likely than men to report depression and anxiety symptoms . . . ,
and respond more poorly following treatment failure.” 197 In the case at
hand, accounting for such gendered harms means considering why
Danielle, and other similarly situated women, sought motherhood
through sperm donation, and what choosing this reproductive route has
meant for them. It may also mean considering the social context in which
the choice of becoming a single mother via sperm donation is made. One
recent study exploring the narratives of single women contemplating
becoming mothers through sperm donation in the United Kingdom found
that this decision “provoked much anxiety and ambivalence for the
participants . . . , with solo motherhood perceived as a ‘risk’ to the
190. Sara Somers et al., The Last Vial. What it Means to (Aspiring) Parents to Use the Same
Sperm Donor for Siblings, 41 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 62, 66 (2019).
191. Id.; see also Petra Nordqvist, ‘I Don’t Want Us to Stand Out More than We Already Do’:
Lesbian Couples Negotiating Family Connections in Donor Conception, 15 SEXUALITIES 644,
652 (2012) (highlighting how genetic relatedness affects perceptions about siblings’ relatedness).
192. Id. at 62.
193. Somers et al., supra note 190, at 66.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Carol Sanger, The Lopsided Harms of Reproductive Negligence, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 29,
40 (2017).
197. Brennan Peterson et al., An Introduction to Infertility Counseling: A Guide for Mental
Health and Medical Professionals, 29 J. ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS 243, 245 (2012).

2020]

Reproductive Dreams and Nightmares

821

construct of a ‘good mother.’” 198 Single women “considered, negotiated
and accounted for the ‘risks’ solo motherhood may pose for their child:
namely, being raised in a family departing from the nuclear family and
not knowing their ‘genetic origins.’” 199 Such narratives elucidate just
how much may be at stake for women who pursue motherhood via sperm
donation, and in turn how much may be lost if it is denied.
VI. CHOOSING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK
While both the contractual and balancing test frameworks may be used
to resolve disputes over the disposition of pre-embryos, the Tennessee
Supreme Court in Davis posited that the balancing test should only come
into play when no prior agreement exists. 200 The court found that
agreements regarding disposition of pre-embryos in the event of
contingencies such as death or divorce, should be presumed valid and
enforced between the parties, reasoning that “the progenitors, having
provided the gametic material giving rise to the pre-embryos, retain
decision-making authority as to their disposition.” 201 It further
recognized that such agreements may be modified at a later stage but only
by an agreement. 202 The court nevertheless found no agreement between
Mary Sue and Junior Davis over the disposition of their frozen preembryos and therefore resorted to the balancing test to resolve the dispute
at hand.
In several of the cases that followed Davis, involving similar facts,
courts have tried to follow the scheme laid out by this decision. 203 In
others, as well as in the Israeli Doe case, courts decided against using the
contractual framework to resolve reproductive disputes. While the
analysis provided thus far highlighted the advantages and pitfalls of each
framework, in the following sections I address directly some principal
arguments for choosing one framework over the other. I then consider
their applicability to Teuscher’s case and the context of sperm donation.

198. Susanna Graham, Being a ‘Good’ Parent: Single Women Reflecting Upon ‘Selfishness’
and ‘Risk’ When Pursuing Motherhood Through Sperm Donation, 35 ANTHROPOLOGY & MED.
249, 260 (2017).
199. Id.
200. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992), aff’d on reh’g, 1992 WL 341632
(Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992).
201. Id. at 597.
202. Id.
203. Forman, Enforceability, supra note 92, at 384 n.27. See also Cohen & Adashi, supra note
116, at 14 (providing an overview of “Major Embryo Disposition Cases in the United States”).
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A. In Favor of Contractual Enforcement
In Kass v. Kass, the New York Court of Appeals held that
cryopreservation agreements should be presumed valid and
enforceable, 204 and that in this particular instance, “the informed
consents signed by the parties unequivocally manifest their mutual
intention that in the present circumstances the pre-zygotes be donated for
research to the IVF program.” 205 After five years of marriage and three
years of fertility treatments which resulted in five cryopreserved fertilized
eggs, Maureen and Steven Kass divorced. Three weeks prior to their
decision to dissolve the marriage, the couple signed four consent forms
detailing the above-mentioned choice of disposition in case of
disagreement. 206 The court highlighted how these agreements “minimize
misunderstandings and maximize procreative liberty by reserving to the
progenitors the authority to make what is in the first instance a
quintessentially personal, private decision. Written agreements also
provide the certainty needed for effective operation of IVF programs.”207
Professor John Robertson, one of the strongest proponents of the
contractual approach, argues that such disposition agreements “should be
enforced when they have been knowingly and intelligently made, and the
parties have relied on them in undergoing IVF.” 208 Robertson provides a
number of reasons the parties’ reliance interest should be granted such
strong protection. Among them is the proposition that pre-determined
dispositional choices, guaranteed by agreements of this kind, may have
been integral to a party’s decision to undertake IVF in the first place.209
More specifically, the certainty provided by agreements in which they
commit to a particular future disposition may be essential to their decision
to engage with IVF. 210 Moreover, since it is the parties’ reproductive
freedom that is at stake, nonenforcement leads to the frustration of the
“freedom they gain by entering into those agreements.” 211 It also leads to
the court’s judgment regarding intimate life decisions replacing that of
the parties. 212
In the case of anonymous sperm donation, the contractual approach
may lead courts to enforce donation agreements signed by donors in
which they relinquished their rights in the sperm. This approach may also
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 565 (N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 567.
Id. at 558–60.
Id. at 565.
Robertson, Precommitment Strategies, supra note 150, at 995.
Id. at 1024–25.
Id. at 1017–18.
Id. at 1027.
Id.
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lead courts to enforce agreements that grant sperm recipients full control
over the sperm vials they had reserved for future use. Although these
provisions lack the detail of those that command one particular course of
action over another, they are nonetheless part of the parties’ reproductive
choices. Enforcing such provisions protects their reliance interest and
their reproductive freedom. This is especially true with regard to sperm
recipients like Teuscher and Doe, who both imagined a reproductive
future in which their children would carry and share a particular genetic
constitution. 213 Knowing in advance that they would not be able to use
the same sperm donor may have affected their decision, and that of others
in their position, to use this reproductive practice to conceive in the first
place.
Indeed, the Israeli Supreme Court was at least willing to recognize that
Doe’s reliance interest had been violated, alongside “additional public
considerations and interests (such as the lateral effects and the need to
preserve the stability of the Sperm Bank).” 214 It nonetheless found her
reliance interest to be insufficient, noting that “the law . . . avoids
coercion with respect to the intimate questions of human life in the
absence of weighty considerations.” 215
There is, however, an argument to be made that employing the
contractual framework in the context of sperm donation protects not only
the interests of recipients, but also those of donors. The latter made a
reproductive decision—a “waiver by contract of the right not to be a
genetic parent.” 216 As Professor Cohen explains in his analysis of this
right, “allowing individuals to contractually waive their right not to be a
genetic parent, notwithstanding that they may later regret that decision,
is a necessary part of respecting them as persons.” 217 In making this
argument, Cohen, like Robertson, highlights the particular value
individuals attach to procreative autonomy that makes freedom of
contract “especially important” in this context.218
In discussing the benefits of using the contractual approach for preembryo disposition agreements, Cohen also considers the “actual
reliance” interest that supports strong enforcement of dispositional
agreements. 219 His framing of the argument, however, focuses on the
“harm to those who have actually relied on contracts promising access to

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Mroz, supra note 1; The Doe Case, supra note 16, at 12.
The Doe Case, supra note 16, at 27.
Id. at 27–28.
Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 15, at 1161.
Id. at 1163.
Id.
Id. at 1167.
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cryopreserved pre-embryos.” 220 For women, “the relationship between
age and fertility . . . may make successful healthy reproduction less likely,
and more costly even if successful since more attempts at IVF will be
needed.” 221 This is in addition to the “discomfort, pain, and health risks”
women incur in the process of harvesting eggs, and the emotional and
financial investments IVF procedures entail. 222 Sperm donation usually
requires less medical intervention and a smaller financial investment, but,
as earlier discussed, the emotional harms may be significant. Despite the
difference between the harms imposed in each scenario, the recipients’
reliance interest—and the arguments in favor of enforcement that rest on
it—may nonetheless be as strong in the context of sperm donation as in
that of pre-embryo disputes.
Proponents of contractual enforcement also point to the broader
context of family contracting, where the enforceability of surrogacy, coparenting contracts, and premarital and postmarital agreements is now
“well established.” 223 These include gamete donation agreements, where
donors waive both the “control over the gametes and his or her parental
rights and obligations over any child conceived.” 224 Indeed, being “the
most well-established and least controversial method of assisted
reproduction,” 225 “neither current United States practice nor case law
suggests that sperm donations of unlimited duration are or should be
impermissible.” 226
B. Against Contractual Enforcement
Even those who support the application of a contractual approach, in
principle, recognize that there are problems with these agreements, both
in the process through which individuals enter them and in their
content. 227 Indeed, some courts were reluctant to enforce dispositional
agreements, even when, like the Davis court, they considered them
desirable vehicles for resolving these disputes. 228 One principal difficulty
is the fact that these agreements are found in consent forms provided by
fertility clinics or by sperm banks. These lengthy documents cover
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Forman, Enforceability, supra note 92, at 395 (arguing that sperm donation is the most
common and least controversial method of assisted reproduction).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 401.
227. Robertson, Precommitment Strategies, supra note 150, at 1016–18; Cohen, Genetic
Parent, supra note 15, at 1179–85; Forman, Enforceability, supra note 92, at 432–42.
228. See Ziegler, supra note 104, at 529 n.106 (highlighting court’s reluctance to enforce
dispositional agreements).
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several issues unrelated to dispositional choices, such as “medical risks
and benefits of the procedure, storage limits and payment terms.” 229 They
often “us[e] highly technical language in densely packed, single-spaced
documents, that may not even clearly delineate the different topics.”230
Further, patients may sign these forms without even reading them. 231 As
the underlying facts of these cases suggest, at times only one of the parties
actually read the form before signing it. 232
On the other hand, it is not clear that the same difficulties arise in the
context of anonymous sperm donation. Unlike IVF and pre-embryo
storage procedures, sperm donation consent forms govern a simpler
interaction between the sperm bank, the donor, and the recipient. Both
donating and purchasing sperm are rather simple processes that do not
involve medical procedures, unlike those in the creation and storage of
pre-embryos. This allows for shorter, more manageable forms, as
illustrated in Doe, where the consent forms signed by both parties were
no longer than three pages. 233 Importantly, these forms govern only the
relation between each party and the sperm bank. They do not govern or
constitute a direct contractual relationship between the donor and
recipient. Lastly, there is a difference in the “social context” of the two
reproductive practices; as two scholars recently noted, “[f]rom a donor’s
perspective, the donation of sperm or oocytes is usually a choice that they
are able to make without any time pressure, with no urgent medical
indication and, in the case of sperm donors, without undergoing an
arduous and stressful medical procedure.” 234 According to them, under
circumstances where recipients “successfully used the donor gametes to
have a child,” or even had simply “chosen a donor and made plans and
assumptions about future treatment on this basis,” the donor should not
be able to be withdraw consent. 235
Other critics challenge the contractual approach as a matter of
principle. They find it inherently inappropriate to use contract law to
decide reproductive disputes, given either the nature of the relationship it
concerns or the parties’ interests that are at stake. Doe echoed these
arguments, where the Israeli Court was reluctant to apply a contractual
framework given the procreational interests at stake. Such an approach,
it is argued, would insufficiently protect individual and societal

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Forman, Clinic Consent Forms, supra note 90, at 67.
Id.
Id. at 75–76.
Id.
The Doe Case, supra note 16, at 5–6.
Frith & Blyth, supra note 149, at 638.
Id. at 639–40.
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interests. 236 According to this line of reasoning, certain areas of human
activity involve rights that should be considered inalienable, “meaning
that promises to relinquish these rights are not enforceable if the person
who made the promise changes her mind.” 237 Inalienable rights
“generally relate to deeply personal decisions that are central to most
people’s identity and sense of self.” 238 These include decisions about
marriage and having children as part of a relationship. As Professor Carl
Coleman has argued in the context of pre-embryo disputes, “[m]aking the
right to control these decisions inalienable ensures that, as a person’s
identity changes over time, she will not be forced to live with the
consequences of prior decisions that are no longer consistent with the
values and preferences of the person she has become.” 239 This argument
raises again the question of harm, but focuses on that which will be
imposed on donors rather than recipients, when the agreements they had
signed with the sperm bank are enforced.
Some justify the conclusion that the right not be a parent—in this case
a genetic parent—is inalienable because of the emotional nature of
reproductive decisions such as the decision to become a surrogate mother.
This characteristic of reproductive decisions, alongside the difficulty of
predicting one’s response to life-altering experiences such as parenthood
or infertility, may lead to the conclusion that it is “impossible to make a
knowing and intelligent decision to relinquish a right in advance of the
time the right is to be exercised.” 240 Moreover, both Coleman 241 and the
236. Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable
Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 88 (1999).
237. Id. at 92.
238. Id. at 95.
239. Id. at 96.
240. Id. at 98.
241. Coleman set out to offer an alternative path for the resolution of pre-embryo disposition
disputes. According to the proposed model, which is based on the idea of mutual consent and is
sometimes referred to as “The Contemporaneous Consent Approach,” decisions regarding the
disposition of frozen pre-embryos will not be contractually binding. Parties may therefore change
their mind about dispositional decision at a later point in time, in such case “the mutual consent
principle would not be satisfied and the previously agreed-upon disposition decision could not be
carried out.” Id. at 111. Without delving into the details of this approach, I will note that it has been
employed by courts in several states across the United States that rejected the contractual approach
as appropriate to resolve the disputes before them. See, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass.
2000) (holding an IVF clinic consent form signed by the parties to the divorce case unenforceable
and stipulating the wife receive the couple’s pre-embryos in the event of their separation); J.B. v.
M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001) (holding that a former husband and wife had never entered into a
separate, binding contract that specified disposition of pre-embryos, that the former wife could not
be forced to allow a surrogate mother to bear a child from the wife’s pre-embryos, and that contracts
entered at the time IVF is begun are enforceable, except that either party may change its mind—up
to a point—regarding the disposition of pre-embryos); In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768
(Iowa 2003) (finding, with regard to pre-embryo contracts, that enforcing prior agreements about
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Doe court similarly ground their objection to the contractual approach in
societal values and “conceptions about the nature of family relationships
and the strength of genetic ties,” 242 as well as in concerns about the
commodification of children and reproduction. 243
Yet this type of public policy concern should not necessarily lead to
rejecting the contractual approach all at once. As Professor Cohen argues
in response to Coleman, some individuals may end up regretting their
contractual choices about genetic parenthood. 244 This is true even if
service providers such as sperm banks or fertility clinic take steps to
better the conditions under which people consent to undergo IVF
treatments or donate gametes. 245 In this sense, the context of reproduction
is not different than other areas of life where contracts are held valid even
though errors people have made in entering them may have significant
consequences for their personal welfare. 246 Furthermore, classifying
reproductive rights as inalienable ignores the fact that “some individuals
are unbothered by the notion that they may have genetic children in
existence with whom they have no relationship, expressing a reluctance
to view them as anything other than ‘other people’s children.’” 247
Importantly, such arguments against contractual enforcement have
limited bearing in the context of anonymous sperm donation. Agreements
governing the use of sperm donations do not concern “intrafamilial”
promises. Unlike couples undergoing fertility treatments, the relationship
between donors and recipients is not a familial one. The social context in
which they make the decision to become a sperm donor or recipient is
different from the intimate setting in which infertile couples decide to
undergo IVF treatments and may deserve to be treated more like a
business transaction.
Undoubtedly, assisted reproductive technologies have become a
lucrative industry provided through what many describe as a market for

pre-embryos would violate public policy where a party had changed its mind, that agreements
entered at the time IVF is begun are enforceable, and that if donors cannot reach a common decision
on pre-embryo disposition then no disposition of any kind can be made without the signed
authorization of both donors). While it is offered as an alternative to the contractual approach, it
may also be regarded as another, albeit narrower, version of it. As Deborah Forman explains, courts
employing this approach “presume that cryopreservation contracts should be enforceable, but only
to a point;” thus “a court following this approach would enforce the agreement in a dispute between
the couple and the clinic.” Forman, Enforceability, supra note 92, at 385.
242. Coleman, supra note 236, at 104.
243. Id.
244. Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 15, at 1181.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1182.
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reproductive services. 248 This reality has been the subject of extensive
criticism over the development of such market and the desired role the
law should play in regulating it. 249 At the same time, and as law Professor
Martha Ertman argues with regard to gamete markets, “market
mechanisms provide unique opportunities for law and culture to
recognize that people form families in different ways.” 250 The
mechanisms of supply and demand operate to subvert a majoritarian
morality that may otherwise prevent single women like Danielle and Doe
from forming families that break from the traditional model. 251 Rejecting
the contractual approach because it undermines certain societal
conceptions regarding the “strength of genetic ties” can itself be
understood as an expression of majoritarian bias toward the genetic
model of parenthood. 252 The genetic model is based in traditional
conservative notions of family and fails to recognize alternative modes
of parenting that are not necessarily based on biological parenthood. In
this sense, contracts facilitate the variety of kinship models through
which singles or couples, married or unmarried, and people of the same
or different sexes, can become parents and start a family. 253 With such
contracts, “[i]nstead of talking about ‘the’ family as one kind of
relationship honored above all others by Nature or God—marriage,
heterosexuality, genetic kinship,” we can “let people decide for
themselves when, whether, how and with whom to form their most
intimate relationships.” 254
C. Application: Anonymous Sperm Donation Agreements
For reasons discussed thus far, I argue that in the context of anonymous
sperm donation, the contractual approach is a more appropriate legal
prism through which disputes should be resolved. In Teuscher’s case, this
means turning to the separate agreements signed by the donor and
Danielle with the sperm bank to decide whether Danielle should regain
access to her reserved sperm vials.
248. See generally BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE NEW POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES
(Michelle Bratcher Goodwin ed., 2010) [hereinafter BABY MARKETS].
249. Martha Ertman, The Upside of Baby Markets, in BABY MARKETS, supra note 248, at 23,
26–27.
250. Id. at 23.
251. Id.
252. Coleman, supra note 236, at 104.
253. See Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved
Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 40–41 (2003) (discussing the theoretical benefits
of an alternative insemination market, including supplementation of societal notions about family
structure).
254. MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL & INFORMAL CONTRACTS
SHAPE ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES, at xii (2015).
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Starting with the donor, a court may look for provisions that explicitly
deny donors the possibility to revoke their consent to use of their sperm.
As noted earlier, in most cases sperm donors relinquish their rights
without time limits and are not offered the opportunity to revoke consent
to use of the sperm at a later date. But even assuming such a provision is
found in the agreement, a court might find it difficult to enforce it if the
agreement does not contemplate the possibility of the donor losing his
anonymity, if anonymity has been guaranteed.
Similar difficulties may arise with regard to the agreement Danielle, as
a recipient, signed with the bank. Ideally, such an agreement includes
provisions that detail under which circumstances the bank can deny her
access to sperm vials she had reserved. For example, it may include a
provision providing that violating the contract she had signed with the
bank by seeking the identity of the donor may result in losing her rights
in the reserved vials. Some direction can also be found in provisions that
consider the possibility of the donor having a change of heart.
If both agreements are silent about the circumstances presented in
Teuscher’s case, a court may resort to the balancing approach for
resolution. In the pre-embryo disposition agreements context for
example, despite most courts’ preference for a contract-based approach,
in many instances courts have had to employ the balancing test when an
existing agreement was silent with regard to all or certain contingencies,
or when the agreement left it to the court to decide. 255
The question of remedies also arises when courts choose the
contractual approach. In considering this question I set aside Danielle’s
breach of the contract and the consequences which may flow from it.
Assuming that the contracts signed by both parties provide that Danielle
could use the additional vials, what will a court do if the donor or the
sperm bank insist on denying her access to these vials? Will the court
order to release the vials to Danielle or will it be limited to awarding
damages?
In the context of pre-embryos disputes, one scholar noted that “[t]he
very factor that might lead us instinctively to reject the option of specific
performance—that the embryos are unique to both parties—in fact
provides the basis for it.” 256 While specific performance is typically
available when damages are not an adequate remedy, given the unique
subject matter, courts would generally refuse to award this remedy
because of concerns over judicial supervision and other practical
difficulties. According to Cohen, however, “[c]ontracts relating to frozen
pre-embryos seem like the paradigmatic case where specific performance
255. Ziegler, supra note 104, at 529.
256. Forman, Enforceability, supra note 92, at 439.
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is appropriate.” 257 Contracts that compel genetic parenthood, he explains,
do not require judicial supervision: “the pre-embryo which has been
cryopreserved is already in the custody of the clinic and the party now
objecting to the contractual arrangement need not do anything for the
contract to be enforced.” 258
For contracts relating to anonymous sperm donation, such arguments
against awarding specific performance seem to apply even less. Not only
that the donor is not required to take any steps, but the context of sperm
donation also operates to eliminate concerns over forcing familial
relationships or legal parenthood and the supervision difficulties that
these in turn give rise to. But the fact that only one party is the genetic
progenitor of the disputed gametes may make a monetary award an
adequate compensation for Danielle, who could use the money to
purchase other sperm vials. Yet that Danielle already brought one child
to the world using the sperm vials may carry the same weight as embryos
created with both parties’ gametes. In any case, this brief discussion
shows why courts are better off deciding the appropriateness of the
remedy on a case by case basis, instead of opting for a “damages-only
regime.” 259
D. Drafting Recommendations
Applying the contractual framework to the case at-hand illustrates how
choosing this approach will only prove fruitful when agreements for
anonymously donating and purchasing sperm anticipate a variety of
circumstances and possibilities that these relationships may entail.
One way to increase the chances of enforcement is for reproductive
service providers to draft better contracts. Sperm donor agreements
should include detailed provisions that contemplate the possibility of
removed anonymity and its consequences for both donors and recipients.
These provisions should account for different scenarios under which
anonymity may be lost, including if the identity of the donor was
discovered intentionally or accidently. Another scenario to consider is
one where the child born through sperm donation seeks the identity of the
donor, rather than the sperm recipient.
The possibility of donors revoking their consent to any further use of
their sperm vials should also be explicitly regarded. Losing anonymity is
one reason for the donor to have a change of heart. Yet the Doe case
demonstrates that there are other weighty reasons, such as embracing new
religious beliefs, worth considering here. The point is that blanket
257. Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 15, at 1186.
258. Id. at 1171.
259. Id. at 1185.

2020]

Reproductive Dreams and Nightmares

831

provisions in which donors relinquish their rights in their sperm may be
harder to enforce under certain sets of relatively novel circumstances,
such as those found in Teuscher’s case.
Clearly, the task of predicting the various issues removed anonymity
may give rise to in the context of sperm donation is not an easy one. Yet
another way to simplify agreements that regulate sperm donation is
perhaps to relinquish anonymity all at once. The Teuscher case well
illustrates the difficulty of maintaining donor anonymity these days,
considering the ease with which one can find his or her genetic progeny.
The donor sibling registry—a website connecting donor-conceived
children with one another as well as with gamete donors that now has
over sixty thousand members—is one example of the elusive nature of
donor anonymity nowadays. The donor movement, led by donor
offspring advocating for more disclosure within the gamete industry and
a “child’s right to know,” make this task even harder. 260 One scholar even
described the ability of sperm banks and egg agencies to promise
anonymity in this age as “fraudulent.” 261
Responding to these changes, a growing number of countries have
reversed their long-held policies protecting gamete donors’ anonymity,
by collecting donors’ identifying information and requiring their consent
to be contacted in the future by any resulting offspring. 262 The US did
not join this trend as of yet, although some think the field of sperm
donation “is on the verge of a major transition.” 263
The question of donor anonymity and the reasons why different
stakeholders in this practice, including donors, recipients, and children,
may want to maintain or abolish it are beyond the scope of this article.
The point here is that at-home DNA kits, as well as online registries, may
soon turn the question of whether donor anonymity is desirable, into
whether donor anonymity is feasible.
CONCLUSION
Reproductive disputes are infamously known for being emotionally
charged and difficult to resolve. At the same time, technological
developments give rise to new types of legal disputes surrounding the use
of even well-established reproductive practices such as sperm donation.
The Teuscher case discussed throughout this article provides a valuable
260. See generally SONIA ALLAN, DONOR CONCEPTION AND THE SEARCH FOR INFORMATION:
FROM SECRECY AND ANONYMITY TO OPENNESS (Shelia A.M. McLean ed., 2017).
261. Naomi Cahn, The New “Art” of Family: Connecting Assisted Reproductive Technologies
& Identity Rights, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1443, 1446 (2018).
262. See generally Sabatello, supra note 10.
263. Peter G. McGovern & William D. Schlaff, Sperm Donor Anonymity: A Concept Rendered
Obsolete by Modern Technology, 109 FERTILITY & STERILITY 230 (2018).
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opportunity to contemplate the legal tools available for those deciding a
dispute between sperm recipients’ interest in having a child with the
sperm they chose, and sperm donors’ interest in avoiding genetic
parenthood.
Analyzing this case against the backdrop of pre-embryo disposition
disputes shows that the context of sperm donation necessitates careful
consideration of the rights at stake. One that recognizes that there are
different models of parenthood besides genetic parenthood. Realizing the
unique characteristics of this type of dispute allows us to question the
harm unwanted genetic procreation may actually impose, and to consider
new types of harm that confounded procreation may entail. The nuanced
analysis provided in this article demonstrates that the contractual
approach is the more appropriate legal prism to adjudicate such
reproductive disputes, considering the non-familial context in which they
occur. It nevertheless acknowledges that this approach has its
shortcomings, proposing that reproductive services providers draft
contracts that are better equipped to govern their long-term relationship
with donors and recipients.
As more people begin to learn, intentionally or not, about their genetic
origins, the more the fertility market’s long-held dedication to donor
anonymity is undermined. This article intends to ease the task of
resolving conflicts between these individuals’ reproductive futures.

